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JURISDICTION OF COURT
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of
Divorce from which this appeal is taken, were entered by the First
Judicial District Court Judge on October 11, 1989.

The Notice of Appeal

was filed November 3, 1989.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article
VIII Section 1 et seq., Utah Constitution; Section 78-2a-l et seq. Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended); and Rule 3, R. Utah Ct. App.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal, by Plaintiff, from a Decree of Divorce signed
by Judge Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial District Court, Cache
County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Respondent differs with some of the statement of facts set
forth in the Appellant's Brief. The additional facts are
set forth below. Paragraph numbers correspond with the
numbers in Appellant's statement of the facts.)
4. Plaintiff testified that in a nine-week period she earned
approximately $2,147.00 or approximately $238.50 a week, (May
transcript, page 63, lines 9-20; page 64, lines 4-12).
5. Plaintiff is trained and has been a licensed beautician for
thirteen years, and has made no effort to obtain employment at a beauty
salon.

(May transcript, page 75, lines 24-25; page 76, lines

1-7).
7. The Court calculated Plaintiff's income at $800.00 plus (June
transcript, page 19, lines 9-11).

The Court felt she demonstrated

employability at that rate (June transcript, page 20, lines 1-10).
1

8. Defendant currently has no over-time available at Thiokol and
none is expected in the foreseeable future (June transcript, page 89,
lines 14-22; Defendant's Exhibit #1). Defendant's salary, or base
income, is $14.53 an hour (May transcript, page 90, lines 2-6). The
Court found Defendant's income at $2,505.00 based on current and
historical income (May transcript, page 173, line 13).

Defendant

testified that his take-home pay is $1,719.00 (May transcript, page 130,
lines 23-25; page 131, lines 1-12).

Defendant works in the space

division at Thiokol and is in some jeopardy in reference to Defendant's
job position (May transcript, page 92, lines 1-10).
12.

Defendant is presently living with his parents (May

transcript, page 132, lines 22-25).

Defendant testified that he can't

afford to live anywhere else (May transcript, Page 133, lines 1-4).
Defendant's sole source of transportation is a 1969 truck that gets
approximately five to eight miles a gallon (May transcript, page 134,
lines 18-23).

Defendant testified that based on what he has been paying

the Plaintiff (alimony and child support), and bills, he doesn't have
any money to do anything else with (May transcript, page 136, lines 1720).

The Court found that Defendant's payment of child support and

alimony obligation to Plaintiff didn't leave Defendant with what he
needed to support himself (June transcript, page 43, lines 18-25; page
44, lines 1-6).
14.
Plaintiff.

A retainer of $500.00 was paid to Plaintiff's counsel by
(May transcript, page 33, lines 21-23; June transcript, page

46, lines 3-5; Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). Plaintiff was awarded $800.00
in attorneys fees, execution stayed on the grounds that Defendant paid
2

Plaintiff $50.00 per month (June transcript, page 63, lines 15-24).

The

Court stated that it was not sure Defendant had the ability to make the
$50.00 a month payment (June transcript, page 63, lines 21-24).

The

Court found that there were assets available by the parties for each to
pay their own attorney fees (June transcript, page 63, lines 3-13).
Other pertinent facts omitted by Plaintiff.
1. The parties acquired a home during the marriage valued at
$76,000.00 (May transcript, page 44, lines 20-25; page 46, lines 18-19;
Paragraph 11, Findings of Fact).
(Paragraph 11, Findings of Fact).
Plaintiff.

The payoff of the home is $25,902.59
Possession of the home was awarded to

Equity in said home was to be split between the parties upon

the following events:

Plaintiff remarries, co-habitates, parties

youngest child reaches the age of majority, or Plaintiff sells the home
(May transcript, page 184, lines 18-22; Paragraph 11, Findings of Fact;
Paragraph 6, Decree of Divorce).

Plaintiff was awarded household

furniture and appliances, which the Court placed at a value of $3,500.00
(Paragraph 12, Findings of Fact; Paragraph 7, Decree of Divorce).

Each

party was awarded one-half of the First Security Bank CD and Savings
Account ($1,231.00 and $513.26), (Paragraph 12, Decree of Divorce;
Paragraph 8, Findings of Fact).

Plaintiff was awarded a judgment

against the Defendant in the sum of $1,175.00 (Paragraph 14, Findings of
Fact; Paragraph 10, Decree of Divorce).

Plaintiff was also awarded one-

half, or $7,897.22, in Defendant's Savings Retirement (ESIP) at Morton
Thiokol Inc., (Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact; Paragraph 15, Decree of
Divorce).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. The trial court findings and the evidentry records reflects
that the trial court seriously weighed and considered the required three
factors in formulating its alimony award of both amount and duration.
The Court found Plaintiff to be an able-bodied person, age 35, with an
employability rate of $800.00 per month.

The Court found that the

Defendant did not have the ability to pay more than what was awarded
Plaintiff for child support and alimony.

Given these factors, the Court

crafted an alimony award which would allow Plaintiff time to get back in
the work force or obtain the necessary education to develop the
necessary skills to enhance her employability.

This alimony award was

made for the purpose of ensuring the economic survival of both parties
and to maintain a lifestyle for Plaintiff as near as possible to what
she had experienced during the parties marriage, considering Defendants
ability to provide.
2. The recent Utah Court of Appeals decision of Motes v. Motes,
786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) does not require the trial court to order
a custodial parent to execute a Section 152 Declaration.

Nevertheless,

the Court found that the Defendant had a greater income than the
Plaintiff, Defendant provided the majority of the income to the children
and Defendant could maximize the greatest financial benefit from the
exemptions. The trial court clearly used discretion in awarding
Defendant two of the children for tax exemption purposes.
3. The record reflects that Plaintiff has assets available to pay
her costs and attorney fees.

Defendant does not have additional monthly

income to pay all of Plaintiff's costs or attorney fees. The trial court
4

did not abuse its discretion in so finding.

Likewise, Plaintiff Is not

entitled to additional costs aad attorney fees incurred on this appeal.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE TRIAL COURT FINDINGS
ABSENT A SHOWING OF CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
The standard of reviewing alimony cases has been established by
the Utah Supreme Court and adopted by the Utah Court of Appeals.

The

Utah Supreme Court in Paffell v. Paffell 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)
stated:
"In an action for divorce, the trial court has
considerable discretion to provide for spousal
support, and this Court will not interfere with a
trial court^s award of such support in a divorce
proceeding absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion."
In Boyel v. Boyel 735 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah
Court of Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court standard of review
stating:
"This court will refrain from disturbing finding of
the trial court in a divorce action unless a clear
abuse of discretion is shown (cite omitted) the trial
court is clearly in the best position to weigh the
evidence, determine creditabllity and arrive at a
factual conclusion . . . "
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED APPELLANT A $300 A MONTH
AWARD OF ALIMONY AFTER CONSIDERING ALL THE FACTORS
In setting an award of alimony, a trial court must consider three
factors, (1) The financial condition and need of the receiving spouse;
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for

5

him/herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide
support Paffell v. Paffell, supra; Nobel v. Nobel 761 P.2d 1369, 1372
(Utah 1988); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App.
1988).
Failure to consider these factors is an abuse of the trial court's
discretion Paffell 732 P.2d at 101.
(1)

Financial Condition and Need of Receiving Spouse.

Plaintiff

testified before the trial court that her monthly living expenses for
herself and the parties four children were $2400.00.

The trial court

awarded Plaintiff $715.00 per month child support for the parties minor
children, and $300.00 per month for alimony.

Additionally, Plaintiff

was awarded property settlements in the amount of $1,231.05, First
Security Bank CD, $513.27 First Security Bank Savings Account, one-half,
or $7,897.22, of Defendant's ESIP from his employment at Morton Thiokol
and a judgment in the sum of $1,175.00 representing the difference in
personal property settlements.
Although the testimony of Plaintiff shows her need to be greater
than the amount of support awarded, this was taken into consideration
when the trial court fixed an award of alimony stating:
"I have read the exhibit. One of the aims of alimony
obviously used to be historically to allow the spouse
to live in a lifestyle to which she was accustomed,
if I can use the art, obviously that is impossible.
There isn't income between those two parties." (June
Transcript, page 42, lines 13-25)
(2)

The ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient

income for herself.

The findings of the court were that the Plaintiff's

computed income and demonstrated eraployability rate was approximately
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$800.00 per month.

Plaintiff's testimony showed that she is a 35-year

old high school graduate without any reference to any health problems,
or inabilities.

Plaintiff testified that she had been back in the work

force the last few years of the parties marriage.

Plaintiff also

testified that she has received an income as high as $1,000 per month in
a given period.

Plaintiff further testified she is a licensed

beautician.
The evidence before the trial court shows that Plaintiff is
capable of full-time employment and/or capable of obtaining the
marketable skills or training necessary to enhance her earning ability.
Plaintiff's counsel stated:
"Certainly Ms. Nielsen does have the ability to earn
the Eight hundred dollars a month that the Court has
found, and it would be ray hope that Ms. Nielsen, if
she gets a decent alimony award would take advantage
of the money to find a way to budget, and cut back,
and do whatever she can do to get the schooling and
then enhance her earning ability, and my hope would be
that after a number of years she would be able to."
(June transcript, pages 34, lines 10-18)
(3)

The ability of the responding spouse to provide support.

The

exhibits presented by Defendant, as well as his testimony at trial,
demonstrated the Defendant's net take-home pay to be $1,719.00 per
month.

Payment of child support in the amount of $715.00 and alimony in

the amount of $300.00, along with $50.00 per month paid towards
Plaintiff's $800.00 in attorney fees, leaves Defendant with $654.00 for
monthly living expenses and necessities.

In the trial court findings:

"I . . . recognize the fact given in the exhibits I
have before me. Mr. Nielsen's spendable income is
extremely limited." (June transcript, page 43, lines
1-3)
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"It doesn't give her (Plaintiff) what she has told
this Court she needs to help her and the family."
(June transcript, page 43, lines 24-25)
"It doesn't leave the Defendant with what he needs to
support himself in his new situation. I can't create
extra money." (June transcript, page 44, lines
1-3)
Plaintiff's assertion that the trial court erred in limiting the
alimony award to $300.00 is baseless.

Given the Defendant's resources

available, the trial court awarded Plaintiff the maximum amount of
alimony which the Defendant had the ability to pay.
The trial court took into consideration the three factors
necessary in computation of the alimony awarded to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's claim that the support award did not equalize her standard
of living enjoyed during the marriage, is clearly one-sided.

The

divorce has obviously caused both parties economic hardship due to the
limited amount of resources available to the parties.

The trial court

record reflects no abuse of discretion in awarding alimony.

The trial

court awarded support to Plaintiff that would equalize the parties
standard of living given the income available.
POINT III.
APPELLANT DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA USED IN ESTABLISHING AN
AWARD OF LONG-TERM ALIMONY AND THE TRIAL DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SO FINDING
Considering the circumstances of the parties and the standard of
Paffell v. Paffell Supra set forth above, the trial court properly
awarded Plaintiff alimony for a three year duration.
In Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court
attempted to establish a criteria for long-term alimony.
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In Jones the

court reversed a declining rehabilitative alimony award finding such
award was inappropriate, and ordering permanent alimony, stating:
"It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in
her mid-50's with no substantial work experience or
training will be able to enter the job market and
support herself in anything even resembling the style
in which the couple had been living.
Similarly, in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)
the court rejected a decreasing alimony award and requested the trial
court to award permanent alimony after a 30-year marriage during which
the wife had remained at home and maintained a household and had held
part-time, short-terra, minimal-wage jobs during the marriage.

See also

Sampinos v. Sampinos, 705 P.2d 615, 618.
Unlike Jones and Rasband the circumstances of the Appellant does
not meet the criteria for long-term alimony.
As stated previously, the evidence before the Court shows
Plaintiff as a 35-year old woman with a high school education.
Plaintiff has a current computed earning capacity of $800.00 plus per
month and has earned as high as $1,000.00 per month.

Plaintiff is a

licensed beautician, but has not sought employment with salons.
Plaintiff suffers no health problems or limitations and is capable and
qualified of full-time employment, school, or training to enhance her
earning ability.
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the trial court, limiting
alimony to three years, is contrary to case law and is a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.

The trend established by both the

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and the circumstances of the
parties in this situation make the award of temporary alimony
9

appropriate.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DEFENDANT TWO OF THE
CHILDREN FOR TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS
The recent case of Motes v. Motes 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989)
provides that the 1984 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, which
automatically entitles the custodial parent dependency exemptions unless
custodial parent signs a written declaration (Section 152) to the
contrary, did not vest courts of their traditional power to allocate tax
dependency exemptions.
Under Motes Supra, this court held that State Courts retain their
traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions.

There was no

finding suggesting that a court must order an execution of a Section 152
Declaration.
The trial court could not have abused its discretion as suggested
by Plaintiff because the trial court did not order Plaintiff to execute
a Section 152 Declaration.

(The parties Decree of Divorce was entered

at the trial court level before Motes.)
Nevertheless, the trial court considered the financial resources
of the parties by allowing Defendant only two of the parties children
for tax deduction purposes until such time as alimony terminates:
" What weight do you give the fact that though he would
have a net of $2,000.00 net income after deducting
his child support. The fact that ... she would also
have a $1,515.00 at that time plus she receives alimony
and also the benefit of the deduction, deductions for tax
exemptions of the children, he would not, and he would have
the alimony tax deduction and she would not." (June
transcript, page 35, lines 20-25; page 36, lines 1-3)
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The trial court then awarded Defendant two of the parties children
as tax deductions stating:
"I'm awarding alimony in the sura of $300.00. That will be
a period of three years. During that period of time, tax
deduction will be divided two and two.
The record reflects that the trial court attempted to maximize
Defendant's financial resources to meet his support obligations to
Plaintiff, since the Defendant's income was greater than the Plaintiff
and Defendant would be providing the majority of the financial support
for the children, and since the deductions would have a greater value to
Defendant than Plaintiff, the trial court used proper discretion in
awarding Defendant two of the parties four children for tax deduction
purposes.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES OR
COSTS AT THE TRIAL OR ON THIS APPEAL
An award of attorney fees in a divorce proceeding, and a decision
to make such award, and the amount thereof, rests primarily in the sound
discretion of the Court.

However, an award must be based on evidence of

both (1) financial need and (2) reasonableness.
P.2d at 1336.

Rasband v. Rasband, 752

Where either of these two factors have not been shown,

the Court has reversed awards of attorneys fees, Beals v. Beals, 682
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984).
(1)

The moving party must show financial need.

The trial court awarded the Plaintiff $800.00 of her $2,200.00 in
attorneys fees incurred.

Execution upon Defendant's payment was stayed

on the condition of payment of $50.00 per month.
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Plaintiff had

previously paid Plaintiff's counsel a $500.00 retainer (Plaintiff
testified that her father loaned her the money) leaving her with a
balance of $900.00 due and owing Plaintiff's counsel.
$2,200.00
800.00
500.00
$ 900.00

Attorney fees
Defendant ordered to pay
Plaintiff's retainer
Balance

Based on support payments paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff,
Plaintiff's earning capacity, and the trial court's award of cash assets
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff clearly has the ability to pay her remaining
balance due on her costs and attorney fees.
Ongoing Monthly Support & Income
$

715.00
300.00
800.00
$1,815.00

Child Support
Alimony
Computed Income
TOTAL

Property Award Which Produce Immediate Cash
$ 1,231.05
513.26
7,897.22
1,175.00
$10,816.53

First Security Bank CD
First Security Bank Savings Account
Plaintiff's half of Defendant's ESIP
Judgement for equity property settlement
TOTAL

In considering an award of attorney fees, the trial court took
into consideration Plaintiff's assets and support, and the Defendant's
ability to pay, stating:
"There's use of these assets which the parties may pay
attorney fees also. So one of the factors, that's a
major factor. I'm going to consider that to be as a
factor. I am considering the fact of maybe some cash
available to pay attorneys fees . . . "
(June
transcript, page 63, lines 6-10)
"Given the three years of alimony payment I'm going to
award [Plaintiff] $800.00 in attorneys fees. I'm
going to stay execution on that however at $50.00 a
month . . . I'm not sure the Defendant has ability to
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make that payment . . . I do, however, think Plaintiff
has some ability to make immediate payment toward that
. . ." (June transcript, page 63, lines 16-25)
Given the evidence before the Court, the trial used sound
discretion in making an award of attorneys fees to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's substantial property settlement and monthly support and
income placed Plaintiff in a position to shoulder her own attorneys
fees.

See Gardner v. Gardner 748 P.2d 1076, 1082 (Utah 1988).

Further,

the trial court could not abuse its discretion as to costs of
litigation.

At no time in the proceeding was evidence addressed to

whether Plaintiff would be able to cover costs of litigation and thereby
none was awarded.
(2)

The reasonableness of the amount of the reward.

At trial, counsel for Plaintiff stated the number of hours
expended on the case, and the hourly rate charged was set forth.
Evidence does reflect an attempt to characterize the Plaintiff's
attorney fees as reasonable.
Plaintiff has failed to show a financial need or the inability to
pay the remaining portion of her attorney fees.

Although the fee seems

to be reasonable, the record reflects that Defendant does not have the
ability to pay the attorney fees already incurred, or Plaintiff's
attorney fees incurred on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court heard and considered all the evidence.

Plaintiff

fails to show how the trial court abused its discretion in the amount or
duration of the alimony awarded, fails to show how the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding Defendant two of the children for tax
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exemption purposes, and fails to show how the trial court abused its
discretion in Plaintiff's partial award of attorney fees.

Plaintiff is

not entitled to additional costs or attorney fees on this appeal.
This Court should affirm the District Court's decision and dismiss
this appeal.
DATED this

/ 7 day of April, 1990.

£go£y S&af>efund
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the BRIEF
OF RESPONDENT in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Larry Jones
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen
175 East 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this /<f

day of April, 1990.

^J2.

14

